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CASE NOTES
master's recommendations should be set aside only upon good cause,
even though the findings were advisory. The court, in the instant case,
interpreted this decision to mean that the reference which instructed
the master to make findings of fact as well as conclusions of law, in effect,
usurped the court's function. The court held that this was tantamount
to permitting the master to render the final decision in the case, since it
left the chancellor powerless to act where there is ample evidence to
sustain the findings of a master. This, the court concluded, could not
be done over the objection of one of the parties.
Perhaps the court erred in its decision through a misinterpretation of
the holding in Harmon v. Harmon. The weight of authority is that a
reference by a court of chancery to a master may be made over the
objection of the parties, but where a party objects to such a reference,
the master's report is to be considered as advisory rather than conclusive.
It is the opinion of the writer that the Harmon case is not in opposition
to the weight of authority. Therefore, there is no apparent precedent
for the decision of this court in quashing the order of reference on the
grounds stated.
DONALD

STUART ZUCKERMAN

EVIDENCE-FEDERAL WAGERING TAX STAMPABATEMENT OF GAMBLING NUISANCE
The state sought to enjoin, as a nuisance, an alleged lottery and

bookmaking business. The state's only evidence was the fact that the
defendants had purchased a Federal Wagering Occupational Tax Stamp
and had paid the tax of 10%, on their gross income from gambling. Held:
Mere purchase and possession of a gambling tax stamp is not sufficient
evidence to establish the maintenance of a gambling house. Boynton v.
State, 75 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1954).
A Florida statute1 makes any place or building wherein gambling is
engaged a nuisance and subject to abatement.2 Even the early common
law held that keeping a gambling house was a public nuisance. 3 The
effect of the statute is that it makes this conduct a nuisance per se,4 to
enjoin which it is only necessary to prove commission of the act.- As a
I. FLA. STAT. § 823.05 (1953).
2. FLA. STAT. § 64.11 (1953).

3. Bowden v. Nugent, 26 Ariz. 485, 226 Pac. 549 (1924); State v. Vaughan,
81 Ark. 117, 98 S.W. 685 (1906); Ehrlick v. Comm., 125 Ky. 742, 102 S.W. 289
(1907); Roberts v. Reille, 50 NY.S.2d 196 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1944); People v. Langan,
196 N.Y. 260, 89 N.E. 921 (1909); Ex ParteAllison, 99 Tex. 455, 90 S.W. 870 (1906).

4. Pompano Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927); State v. 30

Club, 124 Mont. 91, 219 P.2d 307 (1950).
5. Engle v. Scott, 57 Ariz. 383, 114 U.2d 236 (1941); People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d
872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941); Robinson v. \Vestman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N.W.2d 1 (1947).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
result, the state must merely establish the fact that the defendant is
maintaining a gambling house. This may be shown by circumstantial
evidence,0 as well as by direct evidence, 7 providing a casual connection
between the evidence and the defendant is established. 8
The problem then presents itself as to what weight should be placed
upon the purchase and possession of the tax stamp as evidence of gambling.
There are only four other cases in the United States in which the gambling
tax stamp has been used as evidence of violation of gambling laws, and
three of them can be distinguished on their facts.' The remaining case
is a Florida decision' 0 which arose prior to the passage of the statute"
making the stamp prima facie evidence of gambling. The court held
the tax stamp not sufficient in itself to show that the holder was a common
gambler,' 2 indicating that, absent a statute of the aforementioned type,
the stamp is not prima facie evidence.
Due to the paucity of law on the point, it would appear that the
courts would have difficulty in deciding what evidentiary weight to give to
the gambling tax stamp. Some courts have indicated that what has been
previously held with reference to a Federal Liquor License is equally
applicable to the Federal Wagering Stamp.' 3 Therefore it is logical to
assume that when confronted with the problem, and with no other law
on the point, the courts will follow the law with regard to liquor licenses.
It is established that the fact that accused had paid the special Federal
tax as a liquor dealer and had obtained a license is admissible in evidence' 4
6. People v. Renek, 105 Cal. App.2d 277, 233 P.2d 43 (1951): People v.
Gompertz, 103 Cal. App.2d 153, 229 P.2d 105 (1951); People v. Ross, 100 Cal.
App.2d 116, 223 P.2d 85 (1950); People v. Barnhart, 66 Cal. App.2d 714, 153 P.2d
214 (1944); People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 104 P.2d 778 (1940); People v.
Lewis, 91 Cal. App.2d 346, 204 P.2d 919 (1949); Comm. v. Stoe, 167 Pa. Super 300,
74 A.2d 526 (1950).
7. People v. Gompertz, supra note 6; People v. Ross, supra note 6; People v.
Barnhart, supra note 6; People v. Newland, supra note 6.
8. People v. Gompertz, see note 6 supra; People v. O'Brian, 37 Cal. App.2d 708,
100 P.2d 367 (1940); People v. Fisk, 32 Cal. App.2d 26, 89 P.2d 142 (1939); People
v. Rabalete, 28 Cal. App.2d 480, 82 P.2d 707 (1938).
9. riggs v. State, 73 So.2d 382 (Ala. App. 1954) (held that a statute providing
that the possession of a gambling tax stamp was prima facie evidence of violation of
gambling aws was not an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to defendants).
Acklen v. State, 267 S.W.2d 101 (Tenn. 1954). The gambling stamp was not the
only evidence in this case. There was also
testimony of officers, defendants'
confessions, and wagering tax returns. Deitch v. Chattanooga,
195 Tenn. 245. 258
S.W.2d 776 (1953) (city ordinance made it unlawful to possess Federal gambling
stamp).

10.
Rodriguez
So.Zd makes
58 (Fla.possessing
1953). or paying tax for Federal
11. FLA.
STAT.v. §Culbreath,
849.051 66(1953)
gambling stamp prima facie evidence against any person holding same in any prosecution
of such person for violation of gambling laws of this state.
12. Rodriguez v. Culbreath, see note 10 sura.
13. Pompano orse Club v. State, see note 4 sutra. Acklen v. State, see note 9
supra. Deitch v. Chattanooga, see note 9 sumra.
14. King
v. State,
92 352
Okla.(1943);
Cr. 389,
223 P.2d
773 251
(1950);
Nickols
State,
76 Okla.
Cr. 178,
135 P.2d
Brooksher
v. State,
P.2d 200
(Okla.v. 1952):
Ellington v. State, 94 Oksa. Cr. 26, 229 P 2d 902 (1951v; State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492,
94 P.2d 414 (1939).

CASENOTES
to show the maintenance of a liquor nuisance.' 5 The probative value of
such evidence is to be determined in connection with all the other
evidence in the case, ' and, in the absence of a statute making possession
of a license prima facie evidence of guilt,'" the mere issuance of such a
license is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. 18
At the time the instant case was decided, there was a statute'9 which
made the purchase and possession of the gambling stamp prima facie
evidence of violation of the gambling laws. It is interesting to note that
this statute was not even mentioned in this case, although there was an
excellent opportunity to do so, and its logical application would have
resulted in an opposite decision. However, it is probable that the court
refrained from mentioning the statute in anticipation of the case, 20 which
only a few months later, held the statute unconstitutional. Thus the
court appears to have followed the law with regard to liquor licenses.
JOAN M.

F RANKS

CORPORATIONS-CUMULATIVE
VOTING-STAGGER
SYSTEM-UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A stockholder sought to have declared unconstitutional an Illinois
statute' which provided that a corporation could stagger the terms of
office of its directors by designating different classes of directors who are
elected at different intervals. Held, that although the Illinois Constitution,
providing for cumulative voting, did not expressly prohibit director classification, the statute could not be upheld since it defeated the purpose of
cumulative voting. Wolfson v. Avery, Illinois Supreme Court, No. 33563,
April 15, 1955.*
Cumulative voting is a method by which a stockholder, instead of
voting his shares for each of the directors to be elected, is allowed to cast
the whole number of his votes for one director or to concentrate or distribute
15. State v. Kallas, see note 14 supra.
16. Bishop v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. 410, 214 P.2d 971 (1950); White v. Comm.,
107 Va. 901, 59 S.E. 1101 (1907).

17. For example,

ARK. STAT.

§ 48-49 (1947).

18. Appling v. State, 88 Ark. 393, 114 S.W. 927 (1908); Peyton v. State,
83 Ark. 102, 102 S.W. 1110 (1907); Liles v. State, 43 Ark. 95 (1884),
19. FLA. STAT. § 849.051 (1953).
20. Jefferson v. Sweat, 76 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1954)(held statute unconstitutional
on ground that mere possession of the stamp cannot be prima facie evidence that
defendant has been guilty of a crime when there is no evidence of any kind that a
crime has been committed).

1. ILL. CODE ANN. § 157.35 (1951): Providing that when a corporation shall
have nine or more directors they may be divided into classes.
2. ILL. CONST. ART. XI, sec. 3 (1870): Every stockholder shall have the right
to cumulate his vote. ILL. CODE. ANN. § 157.28 (1951).

*A rehearing of this case is anticipated.

